Who\u27s Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and Narrative by Post, Robert C
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 2
January 2005
Who's Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?: Violence and
Public Reason in Nomos and Narrative
Robert C. Post
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Post, Who's Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and Narrative, 17 Yale J.L. & Human. (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol17/iss1/2
Who's Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?:
Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and
Narrative
Robert C. Post*
It is impossible for someone of my generation to re-read Nomos and
Narrative and not be overtaken, once again, by the charisma of Robert
Cover. The text irresistibly recalls Cover's passion and intensity, his
saintly integrity, his astonishing intellectual force, his forthright moral
engagement. Even after twenty years Nomos and Narrative still vividly
evokes the energy and vitality of its author.
So it came as something of a shock when I recently assigned the article
to a seminar I was teaching on popular constitutionalism and found that
my students were virtually indifferent. They found Nomos and Narrative
eloquent, but curious and antique, informed by a sensibility that seemed
distant and indecipherable.
The article didn't move them at all. What had originally endowed
Cover's article with such explosive power was its insistence that law
express nomos, that it signify "a world of right and wrong,", and that the
law offer a guide to life and action, to serious commitments inscribed in
blood. "A legal interpretation," Cover taught, "cannot be valid if no one is
prepared to live by it."2 This was thrilling stuff, especially when laid
against the indifferent positivism of legal process theory, or the knowing
irony of legal realism, or the nascent skepticism of critical legal studies.
Why was it that my students, otherwise bright and passionate, failed to
recognize and respond to Cover's deep and thrilling call for high moral
seriousness?
I believe that the answer lies in Cover's belief that "there is a radical
dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the
* David Boies Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983).
2. Id. at 44.
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organization of law as meaning."3 The law that. interests my students, the
law of the state, is for Cover merely a hollow instrument of violence,
"itself incapable of producing the normative meaning that is life and
growth."4  In Nomos and Narrative the law of the state carries no
republican imprimatur. It is not the result of citizens working together in
public to produce a government that embodies common civic values.
Composed just before the Republican revival and the renaissance of
Rawlsian public reason, Nomos and Narrative is strikingly uninterested in
the normative possibilities of constitutional politics. My best guess is that
the students in my seminar could not relate to Nomos and Narrative
because they regarded these forms of civic engagement as essential to
their life's work.
As against the constitutional politics of the state, Cover associates legal
meaning almost invariably with "autonomous interpretive communities."5
These communities can be insular and turn away from the state. Or they
can be redemptive and attempt to capture the state. But if and when they
do come to control the levers of government power, they seemingly lose
their association with nomos. Cover is not entirely explicit about this in
Nomos and Narrative, but three years later in Violence and the Word he
was quite clear that law, when it emanates from the state, "takes place in a
field of pain and death,"6 and that "pain and death destroy the world that
'interpretation' calls up."7  The law of the state engages "a violent
mechanism through which a substantial part of [the] audience loses its
capacity to think and act autonomously."8
The violence of the law undermines the voluntary affirmation of
meaning required by nomos and interpretation. "Between the idea and the
reality of common meaning falls the shadow of the violence of law,
itself."9 "As long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior
as well as meaning, as long as people are committed to using or resisting
the social organizations of violence in making their interpretations real,
there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can be
achieved."' 0
Cover's perception of violence is so vivid that it eclipses any clear
picture of how the nomos of law can be fused with the force of the state."
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id. at 16.
5. Id. at44.
6. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
7. Id. at 1602.
8. Id. at 1615.
9. Id. at 1629.
10. Id.
11. "In Nomos and Narrative, I . . . emphasized the world-building character of interpretive
commitments in law. However, the thrust of Nomos was that the creation of legal meaning is an
essentially cultural activity which takes place (or best takes place) among smallish groups. Such
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In Nomos and Narrative Cover portrays the state as unrelentingly
evacuated of meaning, as exhausted by its bureaucratic and administrative
structures. This is the context within which Nomos and Narrative
constructs its famous image of jurispathic courts: "Judges are people of
violence," Cover writes, and "because of the violence they command,
judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the
jurispathic office." 2 Although Nomos and Narrative leaves unexplained
the nature of the "because," it nevertheless deeply inhabits the truth of the
proposition.
In Nomos and Narrative judges do not create nomos; they do not call
into being a narrative world of right and wrong. They instead use the
force of the state to crush the competing nomoi of autonomous
communities. Offering a terrible indictment of the Burger Court, Cover
concludes that "[t]he result in all cases is deference to the authoritarian
application of violence, whether it originates in court orders or in systems
of administration."13 The cases "align the interpretive acts of judges with
the acts and interests of those who control the means of violence."' 4
Although Cover does not explicitly deny the possibility that judges can
create nomos,"5 he does conclude that "the commitment of judges" is "to
the hierarchical ordering of authority first, and to interpretive integrity
only later."16  And he does suggest that "the commitment to a
jurisgenerative process that does not defer to the violence of
administration is the judge's only hope of partially extricating himself
from the violence of the state."' 17 It is of course the very possibility of
such extrication that Cover subsequently denies in Violence and the Word.
So Nomos and Narrative turns quite palpably away from the state and
invites us instead "to look to the law evolved by social movements and
communities.' 8  The most to which the state can aspire is what Cover
calls an "imperial" or "world maintaining" attitude toward nomoi. 19 The
state can embody "the universalist virtues that we have come to identify
with modern liberalism," which are "essentially system-maintaining
meaning-creating activity is not naturally coextensive with the range of effective violence used to
achieve social control. Thus, because law is the attempt to build future worlds, the essential tension in
law is between the elaboration of legal meaning and the exercise of or resistance to the violence of
social control." Id. at 1602 n.2.
12. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 53 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 57.
15. See, e.g.,id. at57n.158.
16. Id. at 58. Thus Cover observes: "[T]he tie between administration and coercive violence is
always present, while the relation between administration and popular politics may vary between close
identity and the most attenuated of delegations." Id. at 57.
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. at 13.
Post
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'weak' forces."2  In this mode the state can shelter and protect the
communities that produce paideic nomos; it can pursue "virtues that are
justified by the need to ensure the coexistence of worlds of strong
normative meaning. '21  But these virtues enact "an organizing principle
itself incapable of producing the normative meaning that is life and
growth. '22 The state's sterility is a good thing, however, because a
government that sought to impose "a statist paideia" 23 would be positively
dangerous. It would use violence to crush and displace the autonomous
communities where nomos is actually forged.24
Nomos and Narrative cashes out the imperial virtues in the language of
freedom of association.2 1 "Freedom of association is the most general of
the Constitution's doctrinal categories that speak to the creation and
maintenance of a common life, the social precondition for a nomos."26 In
this way Cover carves out a passive and ultimately libertarian role for the
state.27 The failure of Nomos and Narrative to engage my students stems,
I believe, from the thin, almost vacant quality of its vision of the American
constitutional order. Cover reads American constitutionalism as
committed to an odd, listless version of liberalism.
In a famous passage, Nomos and Narrative concludes by enjoining us
"to stop circumscribing the nomos" and "to invite new worlds."28 But this
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 61.
24. Hence Cover's palpable ambivalence about the very possibility of a true state paideia:
The weakness of the state's claim to authority for its formal umpiring between visions of the
good is evidenced by the state's willingness to abdicate the project of elaborating meaning. The
public curriculum is an embarrassment, for it stands the state at the heart of the paideic
enterprise and creates a statist basis for the meaning as well as for the stipulations of law. The
recognition of this dilemma has led to the second dimension of constitutional precedent
regarding schooling-a breathtaking acknowledgement of the privilege of insular autonomy for
all sorts of groups and associations. . . .The state's extended recognition of associational
autonomy in education is the natural result of the understanding of the problematic character of
the state's paideic role. There must, in sum, be limits to the state's prerogative to provide
interpretive meaning when it exercises its educative function .... Any alternative to these limits
would invite a total crushing of the jurisgenerative character. The state might become committed
to its own meaning and destroy the personal and educative bond that is the germ of meanings
alternative to those of the power wielders.
Id. at 61-62.
25. Id. at 66.
26. Id. at 32.
27. At the end of Nomos and Narrative, Cover does suggest that the failure of Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), lies in the fact that it "gives too much to the statist
determination of the normative world by contributing too little to the statist understanding of the
Constitution." Id. at 66. The formulation is convoluted, because Cover seems to be implying that "a
constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidization of racism" would itself express a nomos.
Id. at 67. But the very possibility that the state might enforce its own nomos is worrisome to Cover, so
he hedges the point by characterizing the potential perspective of the state as a "statist understanding
of the Constitution."
28. Id. at 68.
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invitation raises the question of how different worlds can coexist. The
state is not uniquely jurispathetic; every nomos exists by virtue of its
exclusion and denial of competing nomoi. Jurispathology is in this sense
built into the very sociology of human meaning.2 9 So we must ask how
multiple communities, with their competing and mutually jurispathic
nomoi, can live together. Of course Cover recognizes the problem,3"
which is why he posits an imperial attitude that corresponds to traditional
liberal virtues like freedom of association. But Cover denies that this kind
of liberalism can itself be jurisgenerative. I myself believe that this denial
is mistaken. We are certainly long past the point of regarding liberalism
as a transcendent and neutral incarnation of the "right," as distinct from its
own specific form of the good. It is clear enough that liberalism inhabits
its own world, asserts its own pieties and values, advances its own
narratives of individual self-fashioning.
It is possible that Cover's refusal to acknowledge the distinctive nomos
of liberalism follows from a dilemma in which he was ensnared: If
liberalism is its own nomos, and if liberalism is necessary in order to
preserve the small autonomous communities that Cover finds so
appealing, then the nomos of liberalism acquires a special kind of logical
priority. But Cover is unwilling to recognize this priority, because he is
concerned to insist upon plural worlds of equal nomoi. 3 The price of this
insistence is that Cover cannot adequately theorize how these plural
worlds can continue to co-exist, apart from the "weak" virtues of a
"system-maintaining" empire. The potential nomos of liberalism is thus
reduced to "an organizing principle itself incapable of producing the
normative meaning that is life and growth, 32 and courts are concomitantly
characterized as merely "jurispathic." In Nomos and Narrative courts
"suppress law" and "impose upon laws a hierarchy. It is the multiplicity
of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle, that creates the
problem to which the court and the state are the solution."33  At their
worst, courts solve the problem of proliferating nomos by suppressing the
mulitiplicity of laws; at their best they tolerate jurisgenerative
communities by exercising the negative virtue of freedom of association.
I do not fully understand the emphasis that Cover places on the
jurispathic nature of courts. All nomoi, as I have said, are jurispathic,
29. See, e.g., KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE
(1966).
30. "The question, then, is the extent to which coercion is necessary to the maintenance of
minimum conditions for the creation of legal meaning in autonomous interpretive communities."
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 44.
31. "The challenge presented by the absence of a single, 'objective' interpretation is... the need
to maintain a sense of legal meaning despite the destruction of any pretense of superiority of one
nomos over another." Id.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at 40.
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because all construct their narratives by excluding and suppressing other
possible narratives. The problem with courts is not that they are
jurispathic, but rather that they are violent, and it is the connection to the
organized violence of the state that most deeply troubles Cover and leads
him to doubt the possibility of a true statist paideia. This doubt reflects
the attitude of a generation, of my generation, who faced a violent state
that drafted its citizens to pursue an alien war in Vietnam. In the Vietnam
era we had no public life that we could trust. We confronted a state that
refused to respond to public dialogue or reason, that resorted to brutal
repression whenever its citizens sought to register protest or disagreement.
As a consequence my generation fell back on an ethics of authenticity, of
personal fidelity, of existential commitment. Cover's critique of the
Court's opinion in Bob Jones University well expresses this ethics. Cover
scores the opinion because it is "uncommitted and lackadaisical . . .
unwilling to put much on the line. '34 It reflects merely the "passing will
of the state."35
We might read Nomos and Narrative as a heroic effort to transcend the
individualism implicit in this kind of existentialist perspective. But
although Cover seeks to recapture the possibility of a rich and dynamic
collective life, he locates this life within autonomous communities rather
than in the state. Cover evidently believes that at its core the state will
always turn soulless bureaucrat, violently imposing its arbitrary will. My
students, who were not alive during the Vietnam War, do not experience
any such radical mistrust of the state. They view the state instead as the
instrument of their beliefs, as the potential embodiment of the nomoi with
which they hope to infuse their world.
Ultimately Nomos and Narrative denies the state a role in jurisgenesis
because it is skeptical of the possibility of a jurisgenerative politics. In a
crucial passage criticizing Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California,36 Cover observes that "by the mid-twentieth century the states
had long since lost their character as political communities .... American
political life no longer occurs within a public space dominated by common
mythologies and rites and occupied by neighbors and kin. Other bases are
necessary to support the common life that generates legal traditions."37
I read this passage to deny the possibility that politics within the public
sphere can create legal meaning. The stories Cover tells about state
building are characteristically stories of violence and revolution,38 not of
political debate and discussion. It is ironic that Nomos and Narrative was
34. Id. at 67.
35. Id. at 67 n.195
36. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
37. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 48-49.
38. Cover, Violence, supra note 6, at 1606-08.
[Vol. 17:9
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published just prior to the Republican revival, which attempted to infuse
public life with the virtues of ethical dialogue.39 That dialogue has no
place within Cover's vision, which instead fills the social space between
autonomous communities with conflicts that can be settled only in blood.
Cover does not consider the possibility of persuasion or reason. He does
not ask how communities in conflict can join together in a larger political
community. This skepticism expresses a fundamental truth of the
Vietnam era, when the effort to engage in public reason did not carry very
far. What mattered most was the commitment to put one's body on the
line to stop the juggernaut of the War.
My students, by contrast, inhabit a republican world. They believe in
public dialogue. They study social movements and autonomous
communities precisely in the belief that associations can persuade the
country to adopt their nomoi. They regard a decision like Lawrence v.
Texas40 as evidence of the potential for such persuasion, in which groups
reconfigure public space and alter common perceptions of justice. They
are accordingly bewildered and estranged by the world of Nomos and
Narrative, which is evacuated of political deliberation. My students need
instead a world in which "a common will," to quote Habermas, can be
"communicatively shaped and discursively clarified in the political public
sphere.'
In retrospect, Cover's refusal to theorize public reason seems a great
blind spot of Nomos and Narrative. It virtually guarantees that Cover will
characterize the state as jurispathic and incapable of jurisgenesis. Much
contemporary work in public law begins with a radically different premise
than Nomos and Narrative; it begins with the notion that the state can
express the nomoi of its population, forged through public discussion and
dialogue. It is not afraid of jurispathic courts, because it regards the
judiciary as voicing narratives in which we believe, and it understands all
narratives to be jurispathic. Contemporary public law scholarship
recognizes that reason has limits, that the law of the state inflicts violence,
and that all law ultimately requires commitment. But it regards these facts
as boundary conditions, true in extremis but not descriptive of the
everyday workings of the liberal state. From the perspective of this work,
Nomos and Narrative carries counsels of despair and withdrawal.
I myself can only wish, with genuine fervor, that Cover was wrong in
his assumption that the public sphere is hollow and meaningless. To
engage in the civic life of the nation is to act on the commitment that
Nomos and Narrative was misguided in this regard. Even in the face of
39. See Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. (1988).
40. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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the shocking arrogance and rampant intolerance of those who presently
dominate America, a belief in the potential of public reason seems the
only path forward. Unlike my students, however, who assume that they
can bestride this path with confidence, I myself can never quite shake the
nagging fear that Cover may have seen more deeply than I care to
acknowledge.
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